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OF MISSOURI'S ABORTION LAW
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth1
Suit was brought in the United States District Court of Eastern Mis-
souri challenging the constitutionality of Missouri's abortion statutes2 and
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs were two Missouri
physicians 4 and Planned Parenthood. The District Court declared the Act
constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part; all parties appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. The Court held that several sections of
the Missouri Act were unconstitutional including those requiring spousal
and parental consent5 for first trimester abortions.
6
The Court based the spousal consent ruling on three separate
grounds. First, the provision violated the strictures in Roe v. Wade' which
1. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
2. Regulation of Abortion, §§ 188.010-.085, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
3. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
4. Michael Freiman, M.D., performed abortions in a hospital and clinic in St.
Louis and David Hall, M.D., supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood in
Columbia.
5. 96 S. Ct. at 2841, 2843. Section 188.020, RSMO (1975 Supp.), provides:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy except:
(3) With the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the abor-
tion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to
preserve the life of the mother.
(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis
of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of
eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician
as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.
6. It is to be noted that § 188.025, RSMo (1975 Supp.), which requires
parental and spousal consent subsequent to the first trimester, was not challenged.
Therefore, a physician who performs a second trimester abortion without the
required consents is still exposed to criminal penalties under § 188.025, RSMo
(1975 Supp.).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1
Crist-Brown: Crist-Brown:  Abortion-Possible Alternatives to Unconstitutional Spousal
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
held that the state cannot regulate abortions in the first trimester of
pregnancy;8 the Court reasoned that since the state does not have the
power to regulate abortions in the first trimester, it cannot delegate this
power to the spouse.9 Secondly, while the Court recognized the importance
of the marital relationship, 10 it concluded that the relationship would not
be strengthened by granting the husband an absolute veto in the abortion
decision." Finally, the Court decided that the woman's right to privacy
takes precedence over the husband's interest in the fetus, saying, "Since it is
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance
weighs in her favor."'1 2 In making this ruling, the Court upheld the deci-
sions of the majority of lower courts that had previously considered similar
provisions.'3
In declaring the requirement for parental consent unconstitutional,
the Court reiterated the idea that the state cannot delegate regulatory
power that it does not have.14 Secondly, the Court said that, while minor's
rights are not coextensive with those of adults, minors do have some
constitutionally protected rights which may not be limited without a com-
pelling state interest.1 - The Court concluded that the minor's right to
privacy outweighed the interest of the parents and that the parental con-
sent requirement violated the strictures of Roe and Doe v. Bolton. 16 This
holding is the culmination of a line of lower court cases holding similar
8. Id. at 163.
9. 96 S. Ct. at 2841.
10. The Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 2842.
12. Id.
13. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 3202
(1976) (declared Florida's consent provision invalid); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F.
Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (held the
Kentucky provision invalid); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah), vacated
and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (invalidated the Utah consent provision).
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2843.
15. The Court cited several cases which have upheld the constitutional rights
of minors, among which are Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process right
of students suspended from high school to notice and a hearing upheld); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (right to free speech violated by
suspension from school for wearing arm band to protest Vietnam War); and In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (Right to procedural safeguards in juvenile proceeding
upheld). The minor's right to privacy has also been upheld in Merriken v. Cress-
man, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In holding a school program to identify
potential drug abusers unconstitutional, the court said,
The fact that the students are juveniles does not in any way invalidate
their right to assert their Constitutional right to privacy.
Id. at 918.
16. 96 S. Ct. at 2844. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
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parental consent requirements unconstitutional. 17
The Court's holdings on spousal and parental consent should not be
construed as invalidating all forms of third party consent or notice require-
ments. In declaring the spousal consent provision unconstitutional, Justice
Blackmun said in a footnote that the problem with Missouri's provision is
that it gives the husband a veto rather than notice.18 Stronger language in
the majority opinion indicated that some form of parental consent or
notice could constitutionally be required. 19 The Court reiterated that it
objected only to the blanket veto of the parents.20 The concurring opinion
of Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, agreed with the Court's holding
on spousal consent, but said that the husband's possible interest in the fetus
had not been given due consideration. 2' In discussing the parental consent
requirement, Justice Stewart alluded to its blanket nature and noted that
the state's goal of ensuring parental input in the minor's decision is con-
stitutionally permissible. 22
Justice White, writing for the dissent and joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, would have upheld the constitutionality of
the spousal consent requirement because of the father's interest in the
unborn fetus.23 He stated that the parental consent provision should have
been upheld because it would have protected the minor from her own
improvidence. 24 Justice Stevens also dissented on the parental consent issue
because he believed that the state's interest in the minor's welfare was a
compelling interest outweighing the minor's right to privacy.2 5 Thus, on
spousal consent, three Justices would have upheld Missouri's provision and
two who concurred with the majority opinion felt that the father's rights
were inadequately considered. On the issue of parental consent, four
Justices would have upheld Missouri's provision and two who concurred in
17. Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Poe v. Gerstein, 517
F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affd mem., 96 S. Ct. 3202 (1976); State v. Koome, 84 Wash.
2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 2841-42 n.11:
This section does much more than insure that the husband participate in
the decision whether his wife should have an abortion. The State, instead
has determined that the husband's interest in continuing the pregnancy
of his wife always outweighs any interest on her part in terminating it
irrespective of the condition of their marriage.
19. 96 S. Ct. at 2844. The Court said:
We emphasize that our holding that § 3(4) [of the statute] is invalid does
not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give
effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.
This would indicate that consent would have to come from the parents or the
courts.
20. Id. at 2844.
21. Id. at 2850.
22. Id. at 2851.
23. Id. at 2852.
24. Id. at 2853.
25. Id. at 2857.
1977]
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holding it unconstitutional said that they would accept some type of paren-
tal consent provision.
The Court's decision in Bellotti v. Baird26 hints at what type of provi-
sion for parental consent would be acceptable to the Court. This case
involved a challenge to a Massachusetts abortion statute which required
parental consent for a minor's abortion but provided for a possible judicial
override of a parental veto for "good cause shown." 27 According to one
possible construction, the provision would permit a mature minor to get
judicial consent for an abortion without informing her parents of the
pregnancy.28 The Court refused to rule on the statute's constitutionality on
the ground that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should first
have an opportunity to construe it because it was capable of a construction
which would either render it constitutional or "substantially modify the
federal constitutional challenge. '29 This language, coupled with a refer-
ence to Bellotti in the majority opinion of Justice Blackmun in Planned
Parenthood"° and in the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart3 l demon-
strates a favorable attitude of a majority of the Court toward this type of
provision.3 2
The asset of the Bellotti provision is that, while it ensures the input of a
third party in the minor's decision, it does not give the parents the objec-
tionable "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto. '33 The objectionable fea-
tures of this type of statute are threefold. It would place an additional
burden on the minor when she is already under stress by forcing her to go
to court to override her parent's veto. This might be an undue burden such
as that held unconstitutional in Doe v. Bolton.34 Another difficulty is that of
time. The proceeding would have to be quick and efficient or the delay
might force the minor into either a second trimester abortion which is
26. 96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976).
27. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12P(1) (1974):
(1) If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married,
the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both
of the mother's parents refuse of a judge of the superior court for good
cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing
will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 2866.
29. Id.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 2844.
31. Id. at 2851.
32. It is to be noted that the Court continues to enjoin enforcement of the
Massachusetts statute pending its construction by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court. Motion to vacate denied, 97 S. Ct. 251 (1976) (No's 75-73, 75-109).
33. 96 S. Ct. at 2843.
34. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260
(1975), a doctor was charged with performing an abortion in spite of a veto by the
parents where that veto had been overriden by the juvenile court. The court said
that, even if there were an established court proceeding, the added burden to the
minor was impermissible. They added that the costs and delays were of. the same
type held unconstitutional in Bolton.
[Vol. 42
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more dangerous and expensive3 5 or into not having an abortion at all if the
second trimester had expired.36 Finally, there is case authority to the effect
that juvenile courts may not override the refusal of a parent to consent to
an operation on their minor child unless the operation is necessary to save
life or limb.3 7
A second legislative alternative that might be constitutional would
require notification of the parents of a minor by the physician in order to
allow the parents an opportunity to seek an injunction prohibiting the
proposed abortion. For such an injunction to issue, the parents would have
to prove that the contemplated abortion is not in their daughter's best
interests. This type of provision, suggested in State v. Koome ' 8 is not, to the
author's knowledge, in effect in any state. Here, if the parents could prove
that the abortion would be detrimental to the minor's physical or mental
health, the judge could order the physician not to perform the abortion.
The asset of this type of provision is that it ensures the participation of the
parents in the minor's decision-making while denying them a veto. It also
removes from the minor's shoulders what the Koome court thought to be an
impermissible burden 9 by requiring that the parents initiate judicial pro-
ceedings if they wish to prevent the abortion. Any provision of this type
should set out clear guidelines for the court to use in deciding whether the
parents have made the required showing in order to avoid conflicting, and
possibly arbitrary, decisions on the part of individual judges. The potential
difficulty is that, as in the Massachusetts type of provision, there might be
an undue delay.
A third alternative is to require notification, if possible, of the spouse
or the parents of the unmarried minor. This type of statute, currently in
effect in Utah,40 might be acceptable to the Court. It provides for the
participation of the husband and the parents of the minor in the abortion
decision while denying them any veto power. These parties, who do have
interests recognized by the Court, have an opportunity to protect their
interests, at least to the extent of making their views known to the woman.
One difficulty with this type of provision is that to "notify, if possible ' 41
might be unconstitutionally vague in that it does not define how much
effort must be expended by the physician in trying to ascertain who and
35. Section 188.025, RSMO (1975 Supp), requires that all second trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital, thus making the procedure more expensive.
36. Section 188.030, RSMo (1975 Supp.), prohibits abortions after the second
trimester unless necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
37. Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re Hudson, 13 Wash.
2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
38. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
39. Id. at 914, 530 P.2d at 270.
40. 1974 UTAH LAWS ch. 33, § 76-7-304, provides in part:
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman on whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the
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where the interested parties are. An additional problem is that the Court in
Planned Parenthood was emphatic in declaring the interests of the husband
to be less compelling than those of the wife. It might be concluded that
even notification infringes the wife's right to privacy.
The last alternative is that of statutory silence; the state enacts no
provision as to spousal or parental consent. Without a statutory consent
requirement, physicians would not face serious risk of civil liability by
performing abortions without the husband's consent. However, there are
two theories on which the husband might attempt to recover from the
physician. The first, rejected by the courts, is that he has lost the right to
the procreative potential of the wife.4 2 The second theory is recovery based
on damage to the husband's interest in the fetus.43 Since the Court has held
that the husband's interest in the fetus is not sufficient for criminal en-
forcement of consent provisions, it is unlikely that courts will permit civil
redress.44
Even without a statutory mandate, many doctors will continue to
require the parent's consent before they perform an abortion on a minor.
This stems from the possibility of civil liability for assault and battery. Every
surgical procedure is an unpermitted and offensive touching and thus a
battery unless the surgery is consented to by someone competent to con-
sent.45 The general rule is that the minor is not competent to give such
consent46 unless so empowered by statute or some common law excep-
tion.47 Missouri has a statute which empowers minors to consent to some
types of medical treatment; the statute, however, specifically excludes
abortion.48 Missouri does not appear to recognize the "mature minor"
exception 49 which might cover a significant number of abortions. This
42. Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. App. 1974). A spouse
unsuccessfully sued a physician for an hysterectomy performed on his wife to which
he did not consent.
43. The only case found in which a husband sued the doctor after the
abortion was performed is Touriel v. Benveniste, No. 776790 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct.
20, 1961). The court upheld the father's right to sue; the decision however,
emphasized that abortions at that time were illegal in California.
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), indicated that, at
least in libel, the state may not do with a civil action that which it is not permitted to
do by criminal statute. Civil liability of the doctor for an unconsented to abortion
would chill the woman's right to privacy.
45. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
46. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), says, at 122, "The
general rule is that the consent of the parent is necessary for an operation on a
child".
47. For a discussion of these exceptions see Dunn, The Availability of Abortion,
Sterilization, and Other Medical Treatment for Minor Patients, 44 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 1
(1975).
48. § 431.061, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
49. This rule permits the minor who is close to majority to consent to a
non-serious operation that is performed for her benefit.
296 [Vol. 42
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